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JUDICIAL LAW MAKING AND STARE DECISIS
By F R. Aum N
The Judge as Legislator In addition to their other activi-
ties, the courts of tins country exercise important powers m con-
nection with the law makang process. For one thing, many
courts have the power to make rules and regulations governing
judicial practice and procedure.1 The role of the courts m this
connection in shaping the adjective law has an important effect
on the successful disposition of judicial business in general.-
As a matter of fact, the character of the rules adopted by the
courts largely determines the character of the justice dispensed
by the courts.3 Justice may be substantial, speedy, and mexcpen-
sive in form as a result of the exercise of tins power, or it may
be just the reverse.
The power of the courts to determine what th e law is, if
unwritten, or what it means, if written, vests in them an author-
ity which in effect, if not an form, is a law-making one.4 In
* Francis R. Aumann, A. B. 1921, Ohio Wesleyan University; A. M.
1925, Ohio State University; Ph. D. 1928, University of Iowa; In-
.structor in Political Science, Ohio State University; contributor to
various legal and social science periodicals.
I "In the middle of the last century, legislatures in a wave of
exasperation at the disinclination of the legal profession to take up
reforms of procedure, began to prescribe the minute details of the
conduct of proceedings in the courts."-Pound, Crinmnal Justice in
Ameca Today, p. 208.
2 "The process of legislative rule making is too dilatory, too cum-
bersome, too ill-informed, too subject to pressure from orgamzations
representing but a fragment of the interests involved, to be suited to
the needs of today. Judicial rule making, especially with the aid of
judicial councils, is in the line of advance for procedure."-Pound,
Crminal Justice in America To-day, pp. 208-209.
3 "There has been a definite tendency in recent years to enlarge
the rule-making powers of the courts, and to withdraw from legislative
departments the power to make the detailed rules under which the
courts shall act. In Delaware, Washington, Colorado, New Jersey, and
Michigan, and to a less extent in some other states, courts have been
vested with direct authority to make the rules under which the
judicial procedure shall be carried on."-Dodd, State Government, pp.
70, 217.
4 "All the law," says John C. Gray, "is judge-made law. The shape
in which a statute is imposed upon the community as a guide of con-
duct is that statute as interpreted by the courts. The courts put life
into the dead words of State."--Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law,
Sec. 276. Justice Holmes strikes a similar note in the case of Southern
Paiflic v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. (1917), when he says: "Judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially. They are
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Anglo-Saxon countries where the so-called common law prevails ,
the great 'body of private laws and obligations have been built
up almost wholly by the courts without any formal legislative
action.0 Even where -legislative action has been taken, the
meaning of the legislature is frequently not clear.7 When the
confined from Molar to Molecular motions. A common law judge
could not say, 'I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical
nonsense, and shall not enforcei it in my court. No more could a
judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty say, 'I think
well of the common law rules of master and servant and propose to
introduce them en bloc.'" Justice Cardozo agrees with this general
thesis and elaborates it. "No doubt," he says, "the limits for the
judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the
open spaces in the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond
the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a
chart. He must learn it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness
and proportion that comes with years of habitude in the practice of
an art.'--The Nature of the Judicial. Process, p. 114. "However," he
maintains, "within the confines of these open spaces and those of
precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps
its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not
found but made. The process being legislative demands the legislator's
wisdom."--Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 115. There is nothing
strange or revolutionary about this doctrine, he believes. Indeed he
says, "It is the way the courts have gone about their business for
centuries in the development of the common law."-The Nature of
the Judicial Process, p. 116.5
"Not only in our common law system has this conception made
its way. Even in other systems, where the power of judicial initiative
is more closely limited by statute, a like development is in the air.
Everywhere there is a growing emphasis on the analogy between the
function of the judge and the function, of the legislator. I may cite
Francois Geny, who has developed the analogy with boldness and
suggestive power."-Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p.
119. As a matter of fact the quantity of judge-made law in Continental
European countries is considerable. In France, almost the whole body
of administrative law has been built up by the decisions of the Council
of State, the supreme administrative court of the country
It has been estimated that about two-thirds of the fundamental
rules of English law today is judge-made law. See article by Edward
Jenks in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 30, p. 14. The judge-made law of
England includes the greater part of the law of contract, almost the
whole of the law of torts, all the rules of equity, and the body of law
known as the "conflicts of law." It might also be mentioned that
many important legislative enactments are little more than statutory
declarations of the law which has already been built up by the courts.
See Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, 1905, pp. 360, 484.
7 "Few statements of any rule or principle can be written out in
such a way as to convey exactly the same impression to every mind.
Thought is subtler than its expression. The meaning of written laws
will therefore often be questioned."--Baldwin, The American Judiciary,
p. 181.
"It has generally been regarded as axiomatic in the law that it
is beyond human ingenuity or talent to frame statutes or rules suited
to every contingency, expressed in language concerning the interpre-
tation of which no controversy of substance may arise."--Thmas J.
Walsh, Reform of Federal Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 195, 69th Cong.
1st Sess. at page 3.
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courts are called upon to apply them, they must decide what
the legislature intends to mean.s This duty also invests an im-
portant power in the courts. 9 It is in tins fashion that the law
adjusts itself to a changing environment1o The agency mak-
ing the change is the judicial office.ii The process involved m
making the adjustment is creative in character;12 and the result
is new, living law that attains the end desired.i 3
Where a written constitution has been adopted, the work
of the courts in this connection beccines even more consider-
able. 14 The principles which require judicial interpretation of
8 Occasionally a question is raised in connection with a statute,
which has not occurred to the legislature in the drafting process.
Since the legislature had not intended to deal with the matter in
question, the court must determine not what the legislature meant,
but must "guess what it would have intended on a point not present,
If the point had been present." See Gray, The Nature and Sources of
the Law, 1909, p. 165.
'Note the frequently quoted remarks of Bishop Hoadley who said,
"whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws, it is He who is truly the Law Giver to all intents and purposes
and not the person who first wrote and spoke them." See Gray, The
Nature and Sources of the Law, Sec. 276.
" "Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law."-
Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219, 236 (1924), See Carter, Law,
Its Origin, Growth and Function, (1907)
n "I came to see that instinct in the very nature of the law itself
is change, adaptation, conformity, and that the instrument for all
this change, this adaptation, this conformity, for the making and
nurturing of the law as a thing of life, is the power of the brooding
mind, which in its very brooding makes, creates and changes jural
relations, establishes philosophy, and drawing away from the outworn
past, here a little, and there a little, line after line, precept after
precept, safely and firmly bridges for the judicial mind to pass be-
tween the past and the new future."-Judge Joseph E. Hutcheson,
The Judgment Intuitive-The Function of the "Hunch" in Judiczal
Decisions, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 276, April, 1929.
12 "Repeatedly when one is hard beset, there are principles and
analogies which may be pressed into the service of justice, if one has
the perceiving eye to use them. It is not unlike the divinations of
a scientist. His experiments must be made significant by the flash of
a luminous hypothesis. For the creative process in law, and indeed in
science generally, has a kinship to the creative process in art. Imagi-
nation, whether you call it scientific or artistic, is for each the faculty
that creates."-Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, (1928), pp. 59-60.
1 "The law has its piercing intuitions, its tense apocalyptic
moments. We gather together our principles and precedents and
analogies, even at times our fictions, and summon them to yield the
energy that will best attain the jural end. If our wand has the divin-
ang touch, it will seldom knock in vain. So it is that the conclusion,
however deliberate and labored, has often the aspect of a lucky find."
-Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, (1928) pp. 59-60.
14"A Constitution is the garment which a nation wears. Whether
written or unwritten, it must grow with its growth."--Baldwin, The
American Judiciary, p. 84.
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legislative enactments is inevitably extended with equal force
to constitutional provisions. The people who adopt written
constitutions for their government put their work in a form
which must often give rise to questions as to what they intended
to express. In the application of the constitution, the courts
must decide what it understands its meaning to be. Accordingly
the growth and development of a written constitution is largely
in the hands of the courts of the land.15 This has certainly
been the case in the United States.16
Disregarding all of this important work of the courts in
the legislative field is a group of jurists who maintain that
judges do not "make" the law in any proper sense, but "find
it", that is, they simply determine what the existing custom
is with regard to a point at issue and officilly stamp it with
their approval. This was the orthodox point of view of an
older day and was firmly adhered to by such commentators as
Coke, Hale, and Blackstone.i 7 This theory assumed that the
Common Law was nothing but the customary law and the func-
tion of the judge was merely to find it, not make it.i s The re-
1 "Human affairs being what they are, there must be a loop-hole
for expansion or extension in some part of every scheme of goVern-
ment; and if the Constitution is Rigid, Flexibility must be supplied
from the minds of the Judges."-Bryce, Studies in History and Jurs-
prudence, p. 197.
The Constitution of the United States adopted in the Eighteenth
Century has continued to fulfill its purpose because the courts of the
coutftry have been able to develop it by judicial interpretation suf-
ficiently fast enough to answer the needs of a rapidly changing world.
A recent expression of the nature of this responsibility was made in
the case of Euclid Village v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, (1926), where the
court said: "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which
are applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, would
probably have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive in a
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise."
26C. G. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy
(1914).
1' "The theory of the older writers was that the judges did not
legislate at all. All that the judges did was to throw off the wrappings
and expose the statute to view. (Cf. 33 Pound, Harvard L. R. 731, 733.)
.Since the days of Bentham and Austin, no one, it is believed, has
accepted this theory without deduction or reserve, though even in
modern decisions we find traces of its lingering influence."-Cardozo,
The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 125, Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, (1921), pp. 114-115, Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal
Science, (1928), pp. 59-60; Max Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision,
(1925) 2 Am. Bar. Assn. Journ., p. 359.
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ported decisions of the courts were not the sources of the law
itself, but mere evidences of the customs and of the law derived
therefrom. 19
The notion that judicial decisions are only evidence of a
pre-existing law was opposed vigorously by John Austin- and
many others.20  Today it may be safely asserted that the weight
of juristic opinion holds that judges (Anglo-American at least),
do make law by means of the precedents which they establish
through their decisions.21 To this group judicial legislation is
a necessary factor in the development of the common law. 22
To others, however, it is a usurpation on the part of the
judiciary of a function properly belonging to the legislature.23
Another group has gone to the opposite extreme- "From
holding that the law is never made by judges, the votaries of
the Austiman analysis have been led at times to the conclusion
that it is never made by anyone else. Customs, no matter how
firmly established, are not law, they say, until adopted by the
courts. Even statutes are not laws because the courts must
fix their meaning."24 That is the view of John C. Gray 25 and
Jethro Brown. 26
James C. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual %n the Law, American
Law Review, Vol.-24 pp. 752 ff., for a criticism of this point of view
see Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, Sees. 495, 496, 497, 498,
499, 500.
"'See Blackstone, Commentaries, 68-71, and Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law, Secs. 468-469. Savigney, the Germahn jurist,
accepted the older theory also.
2 Austin criticized "the childish fiction, employed by our judges
that Common Law is not made by them, but is a miraculous
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and
merely declared from time to time by judges." 2 Jurisprudence, (4th
Ed.)
= Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, Law Quarterly Re-
view, Vol. 16, (1900), pp. 376 if.
Thayer, Judicial Legtslation: Its Legitimate Functions n the
Development of the Common Law, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 5,
(1891-92), pp. 172 if.
21 See Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, pp. 210-220; and
Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, (1905), p. 359.
' Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 125.
= "The true view, as I submit, is that the law is what the Judge
declares; that statutes, precedents, the opinions of learned experts,
customs, and morality are the sources of Law."--Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law, Secs. 276, 366, 369.
0 Jethro Brown holds that a statute is not real law till it is con-
strued. It is only "ostensible" law. Real law, he asserts, is not found
anywhere except in the judgment of a court. See Law and Evolution,
29 Yale Law Journal, 294. According to this view Judge Cardozo says:
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Although judicial precedents have exercised great influence
in all systems of law, the degree to which they have been openly
recognized as authoritative simply because they are judicial
decisions has varied widely in different systems. In the Anglo-
American legal system the influence of precedents has been
especially great.27 In this system a precedent has authority 2 8
"It is not merely evidence of the law, it is a source of the law,
and the courts laxe bound to follow the law that is so .estab-
lished. "29 Although precedents of an authoritative character
are generally ,binding on the judges, they may depart from them
when in the opinion of the judges they are wrong because con-
trary to law or reason.3° In practice, however, this has been
"Men go about their business from day to day, and govern their con-
duct by an ignzs fatuus. The rules to which they yield obedience are
in truth not law at all. It is realized only when embodied in a judg-
ment, and in being realized expires. There are no such things as
rules or principles; there are only isolated dooms."-Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 126.
- Sir Frederick Pollock compares the system of case law to the
methods of a natural science: "As science grows and develops with
each new experiment, so are decisions in each case a step in the
growth of the law." See Essays z Jursprudence and Ethics, p. 237;
First Book of Jurisprudence, (2nd ed.) pt. 2, ch. 6.
'4Chief Justice Black of Pennsylvania in discussing the system of
precedents said: "When a point has been solemnly ruled -by the
tribunal of last resort, after a full argument and with the assent of all
the judges, we have the highest evidence which can be procured in
favor of the unwritten law. It is sometimes said that this adherence
to precedent is slavish; that it fetters the mind of the judge and com-
pels him to decide without reference to principle. But let it be
remembered that stare decisis is itself a principle of great magnitude
and importance. A palpable mistake, violating justice, reason,
and law must be corrected, no matter by whom it may have been made.
There are cases in our books which bear such marks of haste and
inattention that they demand reconsideration. There are some which
must be disregarded, because they cannot be reconciled with others.
There are old doctrines of which the authority has become obsolete.
by a total alteration in the circumstances of the country and the prog-
ress of opinion. "Tempora mutantur." We change with the change
of the times as necessarily as we move with the motion of the earth.
But in ordinary cases, to set up our mere notions above the principles
which the country has been acting upon as settled and established is
to make ourselves not the ministers and agents of the law, but the
masters of the law and the tyrants of the people."--McDowel v.
Oyer, 9 Harris' Reports, 423.
** Statement of Sir John Salmond quoted in Holland's Jurispru-
dence (7th ed.) p. 187.
3* In England a precedent "is not merely evidence of the law but
a source of it; and the courts are bound to follow the law that is so
established. Absolute authority exists in the following cases:
(a) Every court is bound by the decisions of all courts superior to
itself. A court of first instance cannot question a decision of the
Court of Appeal, nor can the Court of Appeal refuse to follow the
judgment of the House of Lords. (b) The House of Lords is absolutely
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done infrequently in Anglo-American countries, where the doe-
trine of "stare decisis" has been a fundamental principle of
jurisprudence.31
In continental European countries a different view of the
matter has been taken.32  Jurists applying the Civil Law33
have insisted and still insist that a decision by a court has,
apart from its intrinsic merit, no binding force on a judicial
tribunal.3 4 The practice of the courts does not become a source
bound by its own decisions. (c) The Court of Appeal Is, it would
seem, absolutely bound by its own decisions and by those of older
courts of co-ordinate authority, for example, the Court of Exchequer
Chamber."-Holland, Jurisprudence, (7th ed.) 187.
"The doctrine of "stare decisis" tends to sacrifice the rational
development of the law to the maintenance of certainty. It has been
believed in Anglo-Saxon countries that it is essential for the law to
be certain, and that in securing such certainty some sacrifices arejustifiable. The Earl of Halsbury in discussing this general question
said: "Of course, I do not deny that cases of individual hardship
may arise, and there may be a current of opinion in the profession
that such and such a judgment is erroneous; but what is that occa-
sionat interference with what is perhaps abstract justice as compared
with the inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of having each
question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind
rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in truth
and in fact there is no real final Court of Appeal."-London Street
Tramways Co. Ltd. v. London County Council. (1898), A. C. 375, 380.
'2 The European view is that the disadvantage of following an out-
worn precedent or one which was wrong from the first is much greater
than the occasional inconvience or injustice which may result from
disregarding it. In their opinion, the development of the law should
proceed along the lines of rational principles and abstract justice
rather than upon the strict rule of "stare decisis." Refering to the
case system as "la superstitution du cas," the European turns with
confidence to the methods of the Civil Law. See Kotze, Judicial Pre-
cedent, (1918), Law Times, 349. There will probably always be a
difference of opinion and practice in the matter. In Dicey, Law and
.Public Optnon in England, (1905), pp. 393 ff. there is a discussion of
both sidesof this question. See also Democracy in Amerca, Vol. 2,
Ch. 16, in which De Tocqueville criticizes American lawyers for in-
vestigating what has been done rather than what might be done;
and for engaging in the pursuit of precedent rather than reason.
The present systems of Civil Law found in France, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Belgium, and in nearly all of the Latin American states are
based upon the Code Napoleon. The civil codes of Germany, Japan,
Greece, and many other countries have also drawn heavily upon this
code of law. Indeed it has had a wider influence than the common
law of England. It contains many of the best provisions found in the
civil law of ancient Rome. See Munro, The Governments of Europe,
pp. 515, 516.
14A number of writers have asserted that the distinction between
the civilian and common law systems is greater in theory than in
practice. Thomas Erskine Holland is one writer who has taken this
view. In his volume on Jurtsprudence, (13th ed., 1924), p. 70, he says:
"There have been of late some symptoms of approximation between
the two theories." Roscoe Pound has made a similar expression.
He says: "In fact our practice and the practice of the Roman-law
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of the law until it is definitely fixed by the repetition of prec-
edents wich are in agreement on a single point. Consequently
decided cases affect the law only in so far as they create a prac-
tice or body of doctrine.3 5 "An individual case, even if decided
by the highest court has only a limited persuasive authority,
unless the situation is exceptional."
In France, however, while the judicial precedent has never
had any formal recognition, 36 there is nevertheless a judicial
consensus on many fundamental questions.37 The courts have
found that it is easier and better to maintain a reasonable con-
sisteney in their interpretations of the law As a result, the
written provisions of the codes are gradually being supple-
mented by a small body of judge-made law, which fills the open
world are not so far apart as legal theory makes them seem."--The
Theory of the Judicial Decision, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 36, (1923),
p. 646. Judge Henry of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt who has had
a wide experience with the Common Law system in the United States
before taking up his duties under the Civil Law does not agree with
this opinion, however. He says: "But from my experience in the
actual application of the Civil Law, including of course my observation
of the work of counsel before the court, I have come to the conclusion
that such indicia may be misleading. It is clear that the divergence
In attitude as to precedents between the Civil Law and the Common
Law is still great, and that there is little likelihood of its becoming
substantially less for a long time to come."-Henry, Jurisprudence
Constante and Stare Decisis, (1929), 15 A. B. A. J. II.
sArthur L. Goodhart, Case Law in England and Ameieca, Cornell
Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, Feb. 1930, p. 174.
'O It should be pointed out perhaps, that Administrative law in
France is not embodied in a code, like the civil law. It is made up
of case law which is formed almost entirely of precedents. Some of
the rules have been established by the issuance of decrees, but in
large part they have been accumulated by the decisions of the admin-
istrative courts. To understand the rules of administrative law on
any point, you must study the decisions of the administrative courts.
In this respect it somewhat resembles the common law system. See
Munro, The Governments of Europe, p. 539; James W Garner, French
Adimnistrative Law, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 33, (1924), p. 579 ff.,
The French Judiciary, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 18, (1917), pp. 349 ff.
31"In France, the judicial precedent does not, ipso facto, bind
either the tribunals which established it nor the lower courts; and
the Court of Cassation itself retains the right to go back on its own
decisions. The court of appeal may oppose a doctrine proclaimed by
the Court of Cassation, and this opposition has sometimes led to a
change of opinion on the part of the higher court. The practice of
the courts does not become a source of the law until it is definitely
fixed by the repetition of precedents which are in agreement on a
single point."--Lambert and Wasserman, The Case Method in Canada
and the Possibilities of Its A.daptation to the Civil Law, Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 39, (1929), pp. 1-14.
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spaces in the law and clears -up the obscurities. 38 It should
perhaps be emphasized that tins in no way resembles the great
body of controlling decisions which has been built up in England
and America.3 9 In other European countries, while precedent
is of even less weight than in France, it nevertheless counts.
While in theory they have no more legal authority than the
opinions of textbook writers and commentators, in practice re-
spectful attention is shown them and they are often followed.
The Nature of Precedent in Our Systemn. The decisions of
the courts which make or declare the law are known as prec-
edents. 40 The underlying principle of a decision which con-
stitutes the precedent is the "ratio decidendi," that is, the legal
proposition which furnishes the logical basis for the decision
that is rendered. Any doctrine that the court might have stated
which is not required to support the decision is an "obiter
'Raymond Poincare, How France is Governed, (New York, 1914),
p. 241.
1 Judge Henry in referring to his experience with the civilian sys-
tem in the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt has said: "The codes are sup-
posed to contain the whole of the law, and such theory is by no means
so far from the truth as a Common Law legalist might suppose. In
actual practice certainly 99 per cent of -the cases coming before the
courts are disposed of by the broad general principles to be found in
the codes."--Henry, Jurisprudence Gonstante and Stare Decsts, (1929),
A. B. A. J. 11, 12.
'10 Roscoe Pound, The Theory of the Judicial Decision, 36 Harvard
Law Review, (1923), pp. 641 ff., Gray, The Nature and Sources of the
Law, pp. 187-243; Baldwin, The American Judiciary, pp. 54-71.
"The word 'established' is often used," writes Simeon E. Baldwin,
"to describe the kind of precedent to which the courts are bound to
adhere. What serves to establish one? Long popular usage, repeated
judicial affirmations, and general recognition by approved writers onlegal topics. Of these, in fact, the last is probably the most powerful.
Lawyers and courts, in countries without codes, get their law mainly
from the standard textbooks. Such authors as Coke, Blackstone, Kent,
and Cooley are freely cited and relied on as authorities by the highest
tribunals. (See for instance Western Union Telegraph Co. v. GaNl
Publishing Go., 181 United States Reports, 101, Louisville Ferry Go. v.
Kentucky, 188 United States Reports, 394, 397.) It is by the writings
of such men that judicial precedents are sifted and legal doctrines
finally clothed in approximate terms and arranged in scientific order."
-The American Judiczary (1905), pp. 59-60.
There are precedents which create law for the furture and prec-
edents which merely declare the -pre-existing law. Precedents have
also been classified as authoritative and persuasive. An authoritative
precedent is one which the judges in future cases must follow whether
they approve of it or not; a persuasive precedent is one which is not
obligatory but will be taken into consideration and given such weight
as in the opinion of the court it seems to deserve.-Sir John Salmond,
The Theory of Judicial Precedent, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 16,
(1900), pp. 376 ff.
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dictum" and without the force of law. This being true, it is
not binding upon the courts in the future.41
The -new that the law is never made by the judges is objec-
tionable, the view that it is never made by anyone else is equally
objectionable. The correct view would seem to be somewhere
between the two, in the theory that the power to declare the
law carries with it the power to make the law when none
exists. 42  "Everywhere," says an eminent American jurist,
"there is a growing emphasis on the analogy between the funce-
tion of the judge and the function of the legislator. '4 3
It is the duty of the courts to keep the law up to date by a
continual restatement. In our rapidly changing world this task
of judicial renovation is necessarily increased. That the courts
have- met this responsibility and are continuing to meet it is
quickly apparent when one contemplates the tendency in
American courts to disregard the theory of "stare dectsis" in
determinnng what the law is. In other -words, the courts are
engaged in the process of adjusting the law to new conditions.
In so doing they are creating a new system which will presum-
ably be more in keeping with the principles of social welfare
than the one it displaces.
An analysis of the nature of the "precedent" in the Amer-
ican legal system and the changing attitude of Bench and Bar
to its proper position will throw considerable light on the grow-
ing practice of judicial law-making. For as the force of "prec-
edent" declines, the law-making function of the judges will
become wider in scope. As long as the declining prestige of
"precedent" fails to lead to an active movement for codification
of the law, the law-making role will continue to be greater than
before.
The Future of Precedent in Our System. At the present
time there are many indications that the doctrine of "stare
decisis" is undergoing a marked decline in its influence and
practical application in this country 44 Authority for this
"Gray, The-Nature and Sources of the Law, Sec. 555.
42 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 124-126.
43 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 119.
" There does not seem to be such a trend in England. Justice
Cardozo in comparing the position of the doctrine in this country and
In England said. "The House of Lords holds itself absolutely bound
by its own prior decisions. (Gray, supra, Sec. 462; Salmond, "Jurss-
prudence, p. 164, Sec. 64; Pound, "Juristic Science and the Law," 31
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statement may be found in many places.4 5 We can turn to the
utterances of the courts and in the printed reports find support
ior this statement;40 or we can turn to the leading legal pub-
lications of the country and find expressions which are sinilarly
indicative of a changing attitude toward the doctrine of "stare
decisis." Expressions from both Bench and Bar would lead
one to believe that a modification of the doctrine, 47 if not its
complete abandonment, would find favor in many quarters.48
Harvard L. R. 1053; London Street Tramways Co. v. London County
Council, 1898, A. C. 375, 379.) The United States Supreme Court and
the highest courts of the several states overrule their own prior deci-
sions when manifestly erroneous. (Pollock, "First Book of Jurispru-
dence," pp. 319, 310; Gray, "Judicial Precedents, 9 Harvard L. R. 27,
400.) Pollock in a paper entitled, "The Science of Case Law," written
more than fifty years ago, spoke of the freedom with which this was
done, as suggesting that the law was nothing more than a matter of
individual opinion. (Essays zn Jurisprudence and Ethics, p. 245.)
Since then the tendency has if anything increased."--Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 158. Arthur L. Goodhart gives a
very reasonable explanation as to why the doctrine of "Stare Decisis"
is losing prestige in this country and not in England. "Case Law in
England and America, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, Feb. 1930 pp.
139 ff.
4 "In such matters we can only speak of averages, of tendencies.
And it is, I think, safe to say that in most American jurisdictions
today a more rational theory as to the binding force of precedents
generally obtains than that held by the British House of Lords. The
very multiplication of authority tends to impair to some extent its
force, especially where the decisions in various jurisdictions are in-
consistent and conflicting. The better class of modern lawyers andjudges have in part from th very copiousness of authority come to
regard precedent as their servant and not their master, as presumptive
evidence of what the law is rather than as absolutely conclusive evi-
dence."-Orin McMurray, Changzng Conceptions of Law, (1915) Calif.
L. R. 441, 446.
" In Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 21, 233, 44 Sup. Ct.
302, 309, (1904) Mr. Justice Brandeis cites twelve instances in which
the Supreme Court has reversed itself.
"' Judge Cardozo says: "I think adherence to precedents should
be the rule and not the exception. But I am ready to concede
that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be
abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. There should
be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule
to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined
the conduct of the litigants and particularly when in its origin it was
the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new
significance or development with the progress of the years."--
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judiciai Process, (1921), pp.
149, 150, 151.
48Professor Herman Oliphant takes a very advanced position in
the matter. "Not the judges' opinions, but which way they decide
cases will be the dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study
of law. This is the field of scholarly work worthy of best talents,
for the work to be done is not the study of vague and shifting ration-
alizations, but the study of such tough things as the accumulated
wisdom of men taught by immediate experiences in contemporary
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These expressions do not come from unimportant persons
or places. Quite the contrary, they emanate from sources which
call for attention and respect from the legal profession at large.
Members of the United States Supreme Court,49 the Supreme
Court of Kansas,50 the Supreme Court of Olo,51 and the New
York Court of Appeals52 are included m the list of those persons
who have expressed the view that the doctrine may and should
be modified when circumstances requre it.
Members of the Bar and legal publicists who have expressed
the opnon that the doctrine should be modified to a greater
or lesser exfent would make a distinguished company indeed.
Included in its menbership is a group of eminent law school
life,--battered experiences of judges among brutal facts."-A Return
to Stare Dectsts, 14 A. B. A. J. 71, 159, (1928).
" "The CircuitACourt of Appeals was obviously not bound to follow
its prior decision. The rule of "stare decisis," though one tending
to consistency and uniformity of decision, it not inflexible. Whether
it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is called upon to consider a question
once decided.--"Mr. Justice Lurton in Hertz v, Woodman, (218 U. S.
205, 212, 30 Sup. Ct. 621 (1910).
"Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight
of judicial authority which have been developed in support of this
modern rule, especially as applied to the competeny of witnesses
convicted of crime, proceed upon a sound principle, we conclude that
the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789 should no longer be
applied in such cases as we have here, and that the ruling of the lower
courts on this first claim of error should be approved."-Mr. Justice
Clark in Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 465, 471, 38 Sup. Ct. 148,
150, (1918.)
5"The doctine of "stare decisis" does not preclude a departure
from precedent established by a series of decisions clearly erroneous,
unless property complications have resulted, and a reversal would
work a greater injury and injustice than would ensue by following the
rule.-"Thruston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 625 (1914), 194. In this case the
Supreme Court of Kansas departed from the common law rule concern-
ing dying declarations.
S"A. decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and
righteousness, and no more. It is not enough to say, "thus saith the
court." It must prove its right to control in any given situation by
the degree in which it supports the rights of a party violated and
serves the cause of justice as to all parties concerned."-Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Be kwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 351, 352, 126 N. E. 300, 301,(1919). In this case the court overruled a doctrine which had been
the law of Ohio since 1825.
5 "In fact, there has been no objection raised anywhere to the
right of the wife to maintain the action for criminal conversation
except the plea that the ancient law did not give it to her. Reverence
for antiquity demands no such denial. Courts exist for the purpose
of ameliorating the harshness of ancient laws inconsistent with
modern progress when it can be done without interfering with vested
rights."-Oppenhtm, v. Krsdel, 236 N. Y. 156, 165, 140 N. E. 227, 230
(1923.)
K. L. J.-5
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deans. Dean Roscoe Pound,5 3 Dean Henry H. Wigmore,5 4
Dean Leon Green,55 Dean Orn Maci~urray,5 6 and Associate
Justice Harlan Stone of the United States Supreme Court,57
I "We have developed so minute a jurisprudence of rules, we have
interposed such a cloud of minute deductions between principles and
concrete cases, that our case-law has become ultra-mechanical, and
is no longer an effective instrument of justice if applied with technical
accuracy."-Law rn Books and Law in Action, (1904), 44 Am. L. Rev.
12, 20; Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Col. L. Rev. pp. 605, 614, (1908).
"If we actually set as much store by single decisions as we pur-
port to do in legal theory, the path of the law would lie in a labyrinth.
In truth, our practice has learned to make large allowance for both
of these features of decisions which are inseparable from judge-made
customary law. The tables of cases distinguished and overruled tell
.a significant story."-The Theory of Judicial Decision, (1923), 36
Harvard Law Rev. 940, 943.
r "Is the judge to be bound by his precedent? This part of the
question ought not to trouble us overmuch. Stare dectsis, as an abso-
lute dogma, has seemed to me an unreal fetich. The French Civil
Code expressly repudiated it; and, though French and other Conti-
nental judges do follow precedents to some extent, they do so presum-
ably only to the extent that justice requires it for safety's sake.
Stare dectsts is said to be indispensable for securing certainty in the
application of thd law. But the sufficient answer is that it has not in
fact secured it. Our Judicial law is as uncertain as any law could
well be. We possess all the detriment of uncertainty, which stare
dectss concededly involves,--the government of the living by the
dead, as Herbert Spencer has called it."-Probems of Law, (1920), p. 79.
r"This doctrine (stare decisis) has never been needed, it can
be obviated in any case, but it is sometimes embarrassing and fre-
quently requires subtlety in order to avoid its effects. It creates
infinitely more difficulties than it renders benefits. For one thing, a
court's scheme of things may become so ponderous in the course of
'time that the succeeding judges cannot possibly know what their
predecessors have done. Courts unwittingly reverse themselves more
often than otherwise, and doubtless they spend more time trying to
maintain a consistency of decision than on any other one problem.
Moreover, this feeling that a court must drag along the dead part of
itself creates a psychological dead weight of tremendous import."-
The Duty Problem -in Negligence Cases (1928), 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014,
1036.
Changing Conceptions of Law, (1915), Calif. L. Rev. 441, 446.
""A generation ago the suggestion that we should seriously con-
aider any substitute for the traditional system of developing and
systematizing our law by judicial decisions, corrected or supplemented
by occasional, more or less hap-hazard legislation, would have been
accorded the scant courtesy of mildly derisive opposition. But what
seemed impossible or improbable has already been transferred into
the realm of the probable and those who appraise the tendencies which
give substance and direction to our legal development and who view
the 'future with discerning eye see the problem of law simplification
as one which is not only inevitable but immediate.
But every new citator, every new digest, every new com-
pilation which we eagerly seize upon to lighten our labors comes like
Banquo's ghost, to comfort us with the disquieting reality that the
common law system of precedent which our forbears have cherished
for some ten centuries cannot continue to develop solely through the
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formerly Dean of the Colmnbia Law School. All of these men
have criticized the practice of following the principle of "stare
decisis" too closely Dean Wigmore has been particularly
emphatic in his criticism of the doctrine.
A group of able jurists, including Justice Clarke, 58 Justice
Lurton,59 Justice Cardozo,6 0 Justice Pound,61 and Judge Von
21oschzisker,e2 have advanced somewhat similar ideas, as have
such distingiushed lawyers as John W Davis63 and Lindley L.
Garrison.6 4 An impressive group of legal scholars and publicists
have taken the same general position. Included in this group
are such men as Arthur L. Goodhart,6 5 of Cambridge Univer-
sity, England, Editor of the Law Quarterly Review, Arthur
medium of reported decisions."-Some Aspects of the Problem of Law
Simplification, (1923), 23 Col. L. R. 319, 320.
Supra, note 49.
Supra, note 49.0 Supra, note 47.
0 Case law is not wholly bound by the rules of past generations.
It is a myth of the law that "stare decisis' is impregnable or is any-
thing more than a salutary maxim to promote justice. Although
"certainty is the very essence of the law," the law may be changed
by the courts by reversing or modifying a rule when the rule has been
demonstrated to be erroneous either through failure of adequate
presentation of proper consideration, or consideration out of due time
of the earlier case, or when 'through changed conditions it has become
obviously harmful or detrimental to society' "--Cuthbert W Pound,
Some Recent Phases of the Evolution of Case Law, (1923), 31 Yale
L. J. 361, 363.
02 "If, after thorough examination and deep thought, a prior
judicial decision seems wrong in principle or manifestly out of accord
with modern conditions of life, it should not be followed as a con-
trolling precedent, where departure therefrom can be made without
unduly affecting contract rights or other interests calling for con-
sideration."-Stare Decssss -in Courts of Last Resort, (1924), 37 Har-
vard L. R. 409, 413.
3"To make precedents the fount and origin of the law is to com-
pel their study; to compel their study is to put a premium upon the
knowledge so acquired; and to put a premium upon this knowledge
is to encourage its over-exhibition by the over-zealous. We should
think of the case lawyer at least with the charity due to one who
has been led into temptation."--The Case for the Case Lawyer, 3 Mass.
L. J. 99, 102, (1916).
6"If this system had resulted in an unbroken line of unanimous
decisions, even though it might be admitted that error had crept in
and that many principles had been distorted, and some denied, there
would be much to be said in favor thereof, and great caution would
be proper before attempting to alter the system even for the purpose
of reaching and curing those instances in which error had intruded.
In all, except the simplest matters, there is a great contrariety of
decision and precedent."--Blind Adherence to Precedents, (1907), 51
Am. L. R. 251, 252.
15 Case Law in England and America, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol.
15, p. 186, Feb., 1930.
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L. Corbin, 66 John E. Young,6 7 Edward B. Whitney, s Frederick
G. McKean, Jr.,60 Robert S. Hall,10 Thomas P Hardman, 71
Clarence G. Skelton,7 2 Samuel B. Clarke,7 3 and C. E. Blyden-
baugh.7 4
In short, there is a considerable body of legal opinon in
this country, emanating from respectable sources, which believes
that noticeable modification of the doctrine of "stare decisis"
is now taking place in our system. This relaxation of the
""The legal profession is now on the defensive largely because
of its having put over-emphasis upon one of the sources of declared
rules-the decigions in former cases-to the exclusion of other sources.
Had the judges ever adhered strictly to the doctrine that precedents
are the only sources of the common law and are binding in effect,
surely those precedents would have been overthrown in short order
and the judges along with them. But precedents have been forgotten,
have been disregarded and evaded, have been flatly disapproved and
overruled. We must not forget this fact, even though at times thejudges did not move as fast as other people. These processes have
kept the declared judicial rules within hailing distance of advancing
civilization, although occasionally it is obliged to send out a loud
hail."-The Law and Judge, (1914), Yale Review, pp. 234, 242.
6'Law-as an Expression of Ideals (1917), 27 Yale L. J. 1, 29.
""Yet I believe not only that the doctrine of stare decisis," un-
less some strictly novel and radical legislation can be devised to save
it, must disappear through the inevitable course of human progress-
and progress does not always lead from a worse to a better system-
but that its hold, in the more crowded Federal and State courts at
least, has already to a considerable extent been weakened."--The
Doctrine of Stare Decsis, (1904) 3 Mich. L. Rev. 89, 94.
"The Rule of Precedents, (1927), U. of Pa. L. Rev. 481, 487, 488,
494, 496.
"Precedents and Courts, (1917), 51 Am. L. Rev. 833, 855.
7 "The result is that within the last two years there has been in
many quarters a perceptible change of judicial and juristic attitude
toward the functions of precedents-a tendency in the direction of
conscious judicial renovation, judicial legislation or judicial restate-
ment of the law. With respect to the function of applying such
apt precedents or precepts to the facts of the case, where the logical
or historical application after the manner of the last generation would
defeat the social justice desired, there is in many localities a growing
tendency toward a less mechanical application, so as to do justice in
the individual case or in that class of cases."--Stare Decists and the
Modern Trend, (1926), 32 W Va. L. Q. Note 33, at p. 165-6.
72" The exceptions 8anctioned by the sponsors and advocates
of the rule have consumed it. As a means of promoting stability and
certainty "stare decisis" is a wretched failure.
"Stare Decisis" requires us to assume the unbelievable, that all
precedents have been correctly decided for all time, or else to conclude
that, in its futile attempts to promote stability, -its sole justification
is to perpetuate error."-The Common Law System of Judicial Prec-
edent Compared with Codification as a System of Jurisprudence,
(1918), 23 Dick. L. Rev. 37, 50, 51.
"JWhat May Be Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present
Discontent with the Administration of Justice, (1916), 50 Am. L. Rev.
161, 163.
"Stare Decists, (1918), 86 Central L. J. 388, 339.
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ancient dogma is looked upon by this group as 'a necessary and
wholesome tendency, one which should be encouraged to the
degree that it becomes necessary to adapt our law to the living
present. Indeed there are some who would go so far as to
predict a day when precedents, and especially the precedent of
a single case, will no longer be considered a binding source of
law which judges must accept under all circumstances. 75
Whether we go that far or not, the tendency to relax the force
of precedent m our judicial process is bound to give the judge
a larger role in determining what the law is which shall be
applied.70 The ultimate outcome of this trend is diffieult to
predict. In some quarters the belief is held that the final result
will be a condition approximating the civil law.77 Other observ-
ers are unable to see such a far-reaching change. Whatever
the final state of affairs may be, it would seem safe to say that
in the neantime our judges will enjoy a period in which they
will be given a much freer hand in determining the law, un-
fettered by precedent. In other words, for a time at least, it
would seem that the scope of judicial law-making .will be a
wide one.
75 "Precedents, and especially the precedent of a single case, will
no longer be considered a binding source of law which judges must
accept under all circumstances. Only if decided cases have created a
practice upon which laymen have relied will the American courts feel
that they are bound to follow them. This, as I have attempted to
show, is the doctrine of the civil law and directly contrary to that of
the English law with its insistence upon the need for certainty. I
therefore believe that, as concerns the fundamental doctrine of pre-
cedent, English and American law are at the parting of the ways."-
Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, Essays in Jurisprudence
and the Common Law, p. 74.
70Under the present system our judges have a difficult time in
adjusting the law to the rapidly changing social and economic condi-
tions of the country. "Where a rule has once been decided, even
though wrongly, it is difficult or impossible to depart from it. I do
not agree with those who think that flexibility is a characteristic of
Case Law. The binding force of precedent is a fetter on the discretion
of the judge; but for precedent he would have a much freer hand."-
Geldart, Elements of English Law, p. 28.
""It is, I think, therefore safe to say that the present American
doctrine is strongly away from the strict English doctrine of "stare
decisis." :But is this merely a temporary step to be followed by the
reaction which so frequently succeeds legal innovations, or is it likely
to be accentuated in the future? I believe that the latter is the fact,
and that in no distant time the American doctrine will approximate
the civil law. This will be due in large part to five reasons: (a) the
uncontrollable flood of American decisions, (b) the predominant posi-
tion of constitutional questions in American law, (c) the American
need for flexibility in legal development, (d) the method of teaching
an the American law schools, and (e) the restatement of the law by
the American Law Institute.'--Goodhart, Case Law in England and
America, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law, p. 65.
